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"POWER, NOT REASON": JUSTICE
MARSHALL'S VALEDICTORY AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE
SUPREME COURT'S 1990 TERM
BRUCE A.

GREEN*

In its 1990 Term, the United States Supreme Court heardfive
cases involving the Fourth Amendment. In this article,Professor
Bruce Green analyzes these five search-and-seizuredecisions in
light of Justice Marshall's criticism that '[Plower, not reason, is
the new currency of this Court'sdecision-making." He examines
the various considerations the Court advances in its Fourth
Amendment analysis-interpretiveprinciple, policy, and precedent--and discovers inconsistencies in the importance assigned
to each of these considerationsin a series of cases decided very
close togetherby virtually the same Justices. Each appraochcontrolled, Professor Green argues, only when it could be said to
warranta restrictivereadingof the Fourth Amendment, one that
favored the State. He concludes that, as Justice Marshall's observation suggests, the decisions of a majority of the Court in the
Fourth Amendment area were dictated by nothing more than a
shared set ofpersonalpreferences and a feeling of empowerment
to enact these preferences into law.
I.

INTRODUCTION

With a dissenting opinion filed on the last day of the Supreme
Court's 1990 Term,' Thurgood Marshall took leave of a Court that had
undergone enormous change in the last years of his twenty-four year tenure. For the nation's first African-American justice, the character of the
High Court had greatly changed-both personally and jurisprudentially-from the one to which President Lyndon Johnson had appointed
him. Most obviously, there was a transformation in its composition: of
the eight Warren Court colleagues he had joined almost a quarter century earlier, only Justice Byron White, the only other member of the
Court appointed by a Democratic president, remained.2 A Court domi*

Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University; A.B., Princeton University, 1978;

J.D., Columbia University, 1981. I dedicate this Article with respect and gratitude to Justice
Thurgood Marshall, for whom I had the privilege of serving as a law clerk in the 1982 Term. I
am grateful to Don Capra for his comments on an earlier draft.
1. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619-25 (1991) (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
2. Justice White was appointed in 1962 by President Kennedy.
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nated by septuagenarians a few years earlier had been altered by the retirements, in succession, of Chief Justice Warren Burger, Justice Lewis
Powell, and Justice William Brennan,3 and by the appointments of Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter.4
More substantively, the Court's metamorphosis was reflected in its
view of its own holdings of the recent past. Three times during the 1990
Term the Court flatly overruled recent precedents favorable to criminal
defendants.' In the last of those decisions,6 the Court identified the jurisprudential thread that bound the recent decisions, an explanation Justice
Marshall characterized in dissent as reflecting an "impoverished conception" 7 of the principle of stare decisis: cases involving procedural rights,
as distinguished from property or contractual rights, will be especially
susceptible to reconsideration, particularly those decided by narrow margins over "spirited dissents." 8
Most importantly, however, Justice Marshall identified a change in
the Court's approach to deciding cases. In the opening words of his vale3. Chief Justice Burger retired in 1986, Justice Powell in 1987, and Justice Brennan in
1990.
4. In Payne Justice Marshall identified the change in "this Court's own personnel" as the
real explanation for the majority's decision to overrule two prior decisions that were less than
four years old. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2622 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5. See id. at 2611 (overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991) (overruling Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)); California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991)
(overruling Arkansas v. Sanders, 422 U.S. 753 (1979), and United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2696-97 (1991) (opinion of
Scalia, J.) (arguing for overruling Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-66 (1991) (rejecting dictum in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967)); cf 1d. at 1253 (White, J., dissenting in part) ("Today, a majority of the Court, without
any justification, overrules this vast body of precedent without a word ....
" (citation
omitted)).
6. In Payne a six-justice majority overturned two decisions filed within the past four
years. The earlier decisions had held that juries and judges considering whether to impose the
death penalty may not take account of either the murder victim's personal characteristics,
Gathers,490 U.S. at 811, or the impact of the murder on the victim's family, Booth, 482 U.S. at
504-05. After Payne both are proper considerations in. deciding whether to impose the death
penalty. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
7. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2623 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2610; id at 2622-23 (Marshall, J. dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Marshall took issue with the majority's view of stare decisis:
[S]tare decisis is important not merely because individuals rely on precedent to structure their commercial activity but because fidelity to precedent is part and parcel of a
conception of "the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments."...
Indeed, this function of stare decisis is in many respects even more critical in adjudication involving constitutional liberties than in adjudication involving commercial
entitlements. Because enforcement of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment frequently requires this Court to rein in the forces of democratic politics, this
Court can legitimately lay claim to compliance with its directives only if the public
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dictory dissent, 9 Justice Marshall commented: "Power, not reason, is the
10
new currency of this Court's decisionmaking."'

What did Justice Marshall mean? And, was he right?
What Justice Marshall meant is not hard to fathom. In observing
that the Court had abandoned "reason" as a basis for deciding cases, he
did not, of course, mean that the majority no longer provided reasons for
its particular determinations. As always, the Court filed opinions expressing reasons. Nor did he appear to mean that the reasons given by the

majority could not plausibly justify the results it reached. If not convincing from Justice Marshall's own perspective, the Court's reasons in the
individual cases were by no means frivolous. Rather, Justice Marshall's

point was about the relation between the Court's reasons and its results.
In his view, the outcome of the Court's decisions no longer resulted from

its analysis of law and facts." Instead, the Court moved in reverse, reaunderstands the Court to be implementing "principles... founded in the law rather
than in the proclivities of individuals."...
It does not answer this concern to suggest that Justices owe fidelity to the text of
the Constitution rather than to the case law of this Court interpreting the Constitution.... The text of the Constitution is rarely so plain as to be self-executing; invariably, this Court must develop mediating principles and doctrines in order to bring the
text of constitutional provisions to bear on particular facts. Thus, to rebut the charge
of personal lawmaking, Justices who would discard the mediating principles embodied in precedent must do more than state that they are following the "text" of the
Constitution; they must explain why they are entitled to substitute their mediating
principles for those that are already settled in the law. And such an explanation will
be sufficient to legitimize the departure from precedent only if it measures up to the
extraordinary standard necessary to justify overruling one of this Court's precedents.
Id. at 2623-24 & n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265
(1986); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)).
9. On June 27, 1991, when Justice Marshall initially notified the President of his retirement, he made his retirement effective upon the qualification of his successor. On October 1,
Justice Marshall wrote a second letter to the President, making his retirement effective immediately. In the interim, while the Court was i recess, Justice Marshall continued to serve on
the Court and to participate in its decisions with respect to motions and petitions. Although
his dissent in Payne was his last opinion in an argued case, Justice Marshall did issue subsequent dissents from the Court's denial of stays of execution and petitions for certiorari, including an opinion in McCleskey v. Bowers, 112 S. Ct. 38, 38 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of stay of execution and denial of certiorari).
10. Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's observation
echoes Alexander Hamilton's famous point that courts lose legitimacy when they "exercise
WILL instead of JUDGMENT." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
11. In comments to the press two days after he announced his retirement, Justice Marshall summed up his own approach to deciding cases as follows: "I looked at the facts and the
law and put them together and came out with an opinion and then went to work on the next
one." Ruth Marcus, Plain-Spoken MarshallSpars with Reporters,WASH. PoST, June 29, 1991,
at Al.
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soning backwards from the result it wanted to reach, one almost invariably dictated in criminal cases by a common preference for the state's
interests in law enforcement over the procedural interests of criminal defendants. 12 Having exercised its "power," measured by the ability to garner at least five votes for a desired result, the majority then went back to
identify reasons and incorporate them in an opinion purporting to explain the outcome of the case.
Whether Justice Marshall is correct that legal analysis has ceased
primarily to determine the outcome of the Court's decisions is hard to
say. Since no one but the nine justices are privy to the Court's deliberations, outsiders may derive insights about its decisionmaking process
only inferentially, on the basis of its published opinions. Moreover, the
question cannot easily be answered by analyzing any individual case. In
looking at a single opinion, one cannot ascertain with certainty whether
the reasons given for a particular result are disingenuous, whether the
decisionmaking process described in the opinion is pretextual, or whether
the considerations given weight in the opinion were invoked not because
they were actually deemed important but because they plausibly justified
a desired, predetermined outcome.
Inferences about whether the Court is reasoning backwards from
results, however, might be drawn by looking at the Term's decisions side
by side. By comparing the majority's rationales in a series of related
cases, and particularly by asking whether the Court is consistent in the
considerations it invokes and the weight it gives to those considerations,
one might begin to get a sense of whether the Court's decisionmaking is
the product of reason or power.
This Article addresses the question raised by Justice Marshall's
parting observation about the Court's approach to deciding cases. It
does so by analyzing the five decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment13 in the 1990 Term: Florida v. Jimeno,14 California v. Acevedo,1"
Florida v. Bostick, 6 California v. HodariD.,17 and County of Riverside v.
12. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2623 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he continued vitality of
literally scores of decisions must be understood to depend on nothing more than the proclivities of the individuals who now comprise a majority of this Court.").
13. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
14. Ill S. Ct. 1801 (1991) (decided May 23, 1991).
15. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991) (decided May 30, 1991).
16. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (decided June 20, 1991).
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McLaughlin. 18 Each was reviewed at the behest of the State and decided
in the State's favor. Two of the decisions, Jimeno and Acevedo, analyzed
in Part I of this Article, consider the proper scope of warrantless
searches; the other three, Bostick, HodariD., and County of Riverside,
analyzed in Part II, involve warrantless seizures of individuals. The Article does not undertake to judge whether the majority or the dissent had
the more persuasive argument in each of these cases; undoubtedly, in the
coming year, others will comment on these issues individually in far
greater detail. Rather, the Article identifies and compares, in broad
terms, the considerations given and denied weight in the Court's decisions. By identifying the commonalities and inconsistencies in the
Court's proffered rationales, a clearer picture of its underlying jurisprudence begins to emerge.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that people shall "be secure...
against unreasonable searches and seizures"; if also delineates the process
for obtaining a valid warrant to carry out a search or seizure.1 9 In each
of the Term's Fourth Amendment cases the majority cited one or more
of several jurisprudential considerations as a significant justification for
the outcome. The Court employed two distinct principles of interpretation: the principle that "reasonableness" is the standard governing the
constitutionality of searches and seizures, and the principle that the common law should determine the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.
The Court also purported to rely on the somewhat inconsistent policy in
favor of rules that provide clear guidance to police officers. Finally, the
Court sometimes said that past precedent dictated a particular result.
Each of these considerations, however-interpretive principle, policy,
and precedent-was invoked only when it warranted a restrictive reading
of the Fourth Amendment. When a consideration appeared to warrant
an expansive reading, one favoring the privacy interests of defendants
over the interests of law enforcement, that consideration was rejected.
The Article thus uncovers vast inconsistencies in the importance assigned to these considerations, even within a small group of decisions, all
dealing with the same general subject and issued by virtually the same
justices within a period of just two months.
This Article concludes that the contradictory approaches employed
in the search-and-seizure decisions of this Term cannot be explained
17. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (decided Apr. 23, 1991).
18. 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991) (decided May 13, 1991).
19. For recent commentary on the requirements for obtaining a valid warrant, see Phyllis
T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitatingthe Fourth Amendment, 44
VAND. L. RaV. 473, 512-29 (1991); Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and JudicialReview, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1178-89 (1987).
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away as simply the product of efforts to forge agreement among justices
who employ differing analyses to arrive at a common outcome. Nor can
the contradictions be ascribed to shifts in the composition of the justices

comprising the majority from case to case. Rather, one must almost inevitably come away convinced that the decisions of a majority of the

Court are dictated by nothing so much as a shared set of personal preferences elevating the needs of law enforcement over the privacy interests

underlying the Fourth Amendment and a recognition of their unassailable power to enact those preferences into law.
II.

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

A. ConsensualSearches: The Triumph of PrincipleOver Policy
In Florida v. Jimeno,2 ° the first of two cases dealing with the scope
of warrantless searches, the Court gave short shrift to the policy of draw-

ing bright lines-a policy it would later invoke to explain the outcome of
other Fourth Amendment cases.2 1 Instead, it relied on the interpretive
principle of "reasonableness" to justify construing broadly the authority

of police officers to conduct searches upon consent. 22 A close look at the
majority's opinion, however, reveals that in the hands of the Court "rea-

sonableness" has more rhetorical than interpretive weight.
Like most of the year's Fourth Amendment cases, Jimeno involved
narcotics.2 3 A police officer overheard Jimeno arranging from a public

telephone what sounded like a drug transaction. When Jimeno returned
to his car and drove away, the officer followed.2 4 Apparently realizing
that he lacked "reasonable suspicion" to justify stopping Jimeno's car,25
the officer waited until Jimeno committed a traffic infraction, 26 and then
20. 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
22. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.
23. In his dissenting opinion in California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991), Justice
Stevens pointed out that in the previous eight years the Court had decided 30 search-andseizure cases involving narcotics, all but three in favor of the government. Id. at 2002 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1803.
25. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a brief stop of the car for investigative purposes could have been made if the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
Jimeno of a narcotics violation. Iad at 21-22; see, eg., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
688 (1985) (finding 20-minute detention of vehicle based on articulable suspicion permissible
under Terry); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (requiring "particularized
and objective basis" for suspicion to warrant a Terry stop).
26. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1803. Jimeno made a right turn at a red light without stopping.
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pulled Jimeno's car over.2 7 After informing Jimeno that he believed the
car contained narcotics, the officer asked for permission to search it.
Jimeno consented to the search, saying that he had nothing to hide. The
officer then surveyed the interior of the car, lifted a brown paper bag
from the floorboard, and opened it to discover cocaine.28
On appeal from the trial court's decision to suppress the cocaine
found in the closed bag, both the Florida Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.29 Although they found that Jimeno's consent was voluntary,30 the state courts nevertheless ruled that the officer's
search went too far. Because general consent to search a car does not
imply consent to search closed containers inside the car, the police had to
obtain separate permission to search the paper bag; the court held that
officers may not conduct so specialized a search premised solely on the
suspect's general consent.3 1
In a brief opinion overturning the state supreme court's ruling,
Chief Justice Rehnquist first noted that "[t]he touchstone of the Fourth
27. Neither the defendant nor any of the Justices raised the issue whether the pretextual
nature of the stop should make it unconstitutional. The question of pretextual stops, arrests,
and searches has been approached inconsistently by the lower courts and awaits resolution by
the Supreme Court. See generally John M. Burkoff, The PretextualSearch Doctrine: Now You
See It,
Now You Don't, 17 U. MICH. J.L. RaF. 523, 525-44 (1984) (arguing that the pretextsearches doctrine is no longer vital); James B. Haddad, PretextualFourthAmendment Activity:
Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 639, 681-92 (1985) (discussing whether motive
should play a role in pretextual Fourth Amendment analysis); Daniel S. Jonas, Pretext
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: UnconstitutionalAbuses of Power, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1791, 1816-25 (1989) (comparing pretextual searches to selective prosecution and due process
claims and concluding that they are unconstitutional); Alexander E. Eisemann, Note, Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in Establishing Fourth
Amendment Violations, 63 B.U. L. REv. 223, 265-77 (1983) (arguing that allowing pretextual
searches will undermine the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment unless the ultimate
benefits to society strongly outweigh the costs); Robert D. Snook, Note, Criminal LawPretextualArrestsandAlternatives to the Objective Test, 12 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.105, 127-32
(1990) (offering a new test to determine whether pretextual arrests are in keeping with the
Fourth Amendment).
28. Jimeno, I11 S.Ct. at 1803.
29. Id.
30. It has long been recognized that, as a general matter, police officers may lawfully
conduct a search when a person who has authority to consent to the search voluntarily gives
permission. See, ag., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973); Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). See generally Mary I. Coombs, SharedPrivacy and the
Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1593, 1650-61 (1987)
(proposing a model to determine when the consent of one person allows a search of shared
property); Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaningof "Searches"
in the FourthAmendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319, 344-62 (1984) (arguing that

consent transforms a search into reasonable activity).
31. State v. Jimeno, 550 So. 2d 1176, 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam), aff'd,
564 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (1991).
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Amendment is reasonableness. '3 2 Consensual searches are permissible,
he explained, "because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct
a search once they have been permitted to do so."133 Therefore, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the question before the Court was not
whether Jimeno in fact intended to permit a search of the paper bag, but
whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that
Jimeno intended to permit it.3 4 The Court concluded that it was: since
Jimeno knew the officer was looking for contraband, the officer would
reasonably have understood that Jimeno was permitting a search of those
places, including a paper bag, in which contraband could be concealed. 5
In contrast, the Court noted, it "very likely [would be] unreasonable" to
construe general consent to search a car as permission to break open a
locked briefcase.3

In employing the principle of "reasonableness" to interpret broadly
the scope of permissible searches upon consent, the Court declined to
subscribe to a policy of drawing bright lines in Fourth Amendment juris-

prudence. Although Jimeno makes clear that the Court favors a liberal
construction of consent to search, the approach it endorses will nevertheless generate uncertainty for police officers and spawn pretrial litigation
over whether officers reasonably construed consent in individual cases.
The open-ended standard of "reasonableness" invites a multitude of ar-

guments by future defendants that slight factual variations from Jimeno
should yield a different result.

First, future defendants might attempt to distinguish Jimeno on dif32. Jimeno, 111 S.Ct. at 1803. Prior to the Court's decision in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110
S.Ct. 2793 (1990), the theoretical basis for upholding warrantless searches upon consent was
unclear. Id at 2801. The Court's earliest decisions seemed to view consent as a "waiver" of
one's Fourth Amendment rights. See, eg., Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13.
That view, however, was rejected by the Court in Schneckloth which held that to be valid
consent must be voluntary but need not be "knowing," as is required for a valid waiver of trial
rights. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 246. A consensual search might also be justified on the theory
that an individual who gives permission to search voluntarily relinquishes his expectation of
privacy. See Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2802 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his opinion for the
Court in Rodriguez, however, Justice Scalia rejected both these theories in favor of the one
reasserted in Jimeno, namely, that consent makes a search reasonable. Id. at 2797.
The Rodriguez Court held constitutional a search conducted upon the permission of a
person who reasonably appeared to have authority to give consent, even though, as it later
turned out, she did not in fact have authority. Id at 2801. Had the propriety of the search
depended on whether the person whose property was searched in fact waived the right to
privacy or in fact had a reduced expectation of privacy, the search would have been improper.
The question that Rodriguez begs, however, is' how, to determine whether a search is
"reasonable."
33.
34.
35.
36.

Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1803.
Id. at 1803-04.
Id at 1804.
Id
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ferences in the way the officer requests consent. For example, if an officer
does not inform the suspect that he is looking for narcotics, it is arguably
less reasonable for the officer to infer that the suspect's consent includes
peftission to search all paper bags inside the car.3 7 Furthermore,
Jimeno may be distinguished when different types of containers are
searched. Indeed, the Court suggested that a search of a locked suitcase
would probably exceed the scope of general consent, presumably because
of the extent of the intrusion involved in breaking open a lock.3" The
Court did not address whether searches of unlocked suitcases, giftwrapped packages, or the like also might be treated differently from paper bags. Because these containers either evidence a greater expectation
of privacy or are less likely to contain narcotics than paper bags, the
"reasonableness" of extending searches authorized generally to these particular containers remains ripe for litigation. Similarly, efforts may be
made to distinguish Jimeno based on the nature of the place searched.
General consent to search a house, for example, may warrant a narrower
construction of the scope of consent in light of the greater expectation of
privacy that people have in their residences as compared to the expectation of privacy they are held to have in their automobiles.3 9 Finally, a
defendant may argue that he consented to an intrusion meaningfully different in kind from the one the officer conducted.'
In contrast to the majority's nebulous "reasonableness" standard,
the approach rejected by the Court would vastly minimize uncertainty by
requiring an officer to seek clarification as to the scope of the search permitted from a suspect at the time of the search. In a dissenting opinion
joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Marshall explained that officers, not
suspects, should have the burden of clarifying the scope of the search
intended4 1 since an individual's general consent to search a car is, at the
very least, ambiguous with respect to closed containers inside his car.4 2
37. Cf State v. Hyland, No. 17131, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 1544 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 9,
1991). The Hyland court reasoned as followsAs emphasized in Jimeno, the scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed
object. In the instant case, there was no expressed object.... We are unpersuaded a
reasonable person would have understood appellant's permission to look in a suitcase-manifested by appellant's opening it-carried with it the permission to reach
inside and remove anything that felt suspicious.
Id. at "20-'21.
38. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.
39. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
40. See, eg., Hyland, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 1544, at *21 (holding that permission to
look in suitcase did not authorize officer physically to search beneath surface clothing).
41. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1805-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. Id at 1805 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall relied in part on decisions
holding that people have a greater expectation of privacy in closed containers inside an auto-
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Under this approach, factual nuances concerning what the officer said,

what the suspect replied, and what the officer then did in conducting a
consensual search are comparatively unimportant. The officer knows at

the time of the search whether he is acting within the scope of authorization, rather than having to interpret an ambiguous, general consent. The
trial court in turn is spared having to make a post hoc legal finding about

whether the officer reasonably construed the scope of the suspect's
consent.
The Court responded to the dissent's argument that police officers
should obtain specific permission before opening containers in two ways.

First, it exhorted that there is "no basis for adding this sort of superstructure to the Fourth Amendment's basic test of reasonableness," 4 3 thus
suggesting that the Fourth Amendment's overarching principle of reasonableness does not permit a "rigid" rule like the one urged by the dissent. This reasoning is curious, however, given the Court's traditional

willingness to derive categorical rules from the general principle of "reasonableness."' Although categorical, the dissent's approach is entirely
consistent with the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a search and
seizure be "reasonable." The dissenting justices simply considered it un-

reasonable for an officer to search a container on the basis of a suspect's
general consent to search the place in which the container was found.45
A requirement of specific consent to search containers would not constitute a constitutional "superstructure" but would logically grow out of

this view of what is reasonable.
Second, the Court cited the societal interest in the discovery of
"'necessary

evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime,' ,46

thereby implying that the real failing of the dissent's approach is that it
mobile than in other areas in the automobile. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia,
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)).
These decisions were overruled later in the 1990 Term in California v. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct.
1982 (1991), discussed infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
43. Jimeno, I 1l S. Ct. at 1804. Three weeks after the decision in Jimeno, the Court made
use of this same metaphor in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (1991). McNeil rejected a
defendant's claim that, by invoking the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a judicial proceeding, he implicitly invoked his Miranda right to counsel as well. Id. at 2208-11. In concluding his decision for the Court, Justice Scalia noted: " 'This Court is forever adding new
stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one
story too many is added.' We decline to add yet another story to Miranda." Id. at 2211
(quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (opinion of Jackson, J.)).
44. See, eg., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that police may
search an individual incident to a lawful arrest); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705
(1981) (holding that police searching residence for contraband pursuant to a warrant may
detain individuals residing there).
45. Jimeno, 111 S.Ct. at 1806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1804 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973)).
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would limit the number of searches that could be conducted upon consent. By providing the suspect with a chance to clarify his intent, the
dissent's approach might preclude some closed container searches that
the initial consent might be construed broadly enough to permit. 47 In
contrast, the majority's approach places the burden of clarification on the
suspect4 8 and allows officers to take advantage of his failure or inability
to do so by relying on a "reasonable," but erroneous, interpretation of
the suspect's permission.4 9 Unlike the dissent's approach, which would
both provide guidance to police officers and require strict adherence to
the actual intentions of those who voluntarily permit officers to search
their property, the majority's approach strongly promotes the interest in
the discovery of evidence.
Although the Court ostensibly relied not on the concern for promoting criminal investigations but on the supposedly value-neutral principle
of "reasonableness," 5 0 the outcome of Jimeno cannot fairly be said to
have been dictated by the concept of "reasonableness." As employed by
the Court, that concept is far too malleable to provide meaningful guidance for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches. In
the view of the Jimeno majority, the bedrock principle that searches satisfy the Fourth Amendment if they are "reasonable" led ineluctably to
the conclusion that a consensual search was proper in scope if the officer
was "reasonable" in believing that the suspect had consented to the
search performed.5 1 Thus, the Court equated "reasonableness" from a
constitutional perspective with "reasonableness" from a police officer's
perspective. Nothing in the Jimeno opinion, however, and certainly
nothing inherent in the open-ended concept of "reasonableness," explains
why the Court adopted the officer's perspective as the benchmark for
constitutional reasonableness.
Assessing the permissible scope of consensual searches from a reasonable police officer's perspective does not seem to derive from the con47. Id at 1806 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In addition, in some cases in which a suspect
genuinely intends his general consent to be broad enough to authorize an extensive search, a
request for specific consent to search containers might lead the suspect to reconsider and terminate the search, or limit its scope.
48. Id. at 1804 ("A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to
which he consents.").
49. See id. at 1806 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall explained:
The only objection that the police could have to such a rule [requiring them to clarify
the scope of the suspect's consent] is that it would prevent them from exploiting the
ignorance of a citizen who simply did not anticipate that his consent to search the car
would be understood to authorize the police to rummage through his packages.
Id. (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
50. Id. at 1804.
51. Id. at 1803-04.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

stitutional concept of "reasonableness." To the contrary, the Court's
prior decisions make clear that what is reasonable from a constitutional
perspective may be quite different from what is reasonable from a police
officer's perspective.52
Had the Jimeno Court focused on the precise question of whether
the officer's conduct was constitutionally reasonable, it would have had
far greater difficultly justifying the scope of the search. The Court would
have had to decide whether it is reasonable for a police officer, having
sought and received general consent to search a car, to search closed
containers found inside the car without specific permission to do so. The
answer might turn on how a reasonable officer would have interpreted
the suspect's permission-but only in part. If the search of the paper bag
would have seemed unequivocally to be within the scope of the suspect's
consent, from an officer's point of view, then the ensuing search might be
reasonable as a constitutional matter, since the officer would not then
have been on notice of the possible need for further inquiry. 3 But if the
suspect's permission would have appeared ambiguous, it might not matter that the officer's interpretation of the general consent was a reasonable one. From a constitutional perspective, it may be unreasonable for
an officer to act on his own interpretation of concededly unclear authorization rather than seeking clarification. 4 It could well be argued that
52. For example, the Court recognized the distinction between "reasonableness" for
Fourth Amendment purposes and what a law enforcement officer reasonably believes in
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), when it adopted a "good faith" exception to the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. Id at 926. In Leon police officers conducted a search
based on a warrant not supported by probable cause. Id at 903. The search was objectively
reasonable from the officers' perspective, because in performing the search they relied in good
faith on the judgment of the magistrate who issued the warrant. Id at 920. Nevertheless, the
Court accepted the district court's finding that the search itself was unreasonable from a constitutional perspective, and thus a violation of the Fourth Amendment, because of the absence
of probable cause. Id at 904-05. Although the reasonableness of the officers' conduct justified
an exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence discovered upon execution of the defective
search warrant, it did not make the search itself reasonable, and therefore lawful, under the
Fourth Amendment. Id at 922-23. For commentary on the good faith exception, see Craig
M. Bradley, The "Good FaithException" Cases: ReasonableExercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J.
287 (1985); Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986); Goldstein, supra note
19, at 1173 (1987); Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69
IOWA L. REv. 551 (1984).
53. This was the fact pattern in Illinois v. Rodrigu ez, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (1990). The officers
apparently had little reason to believe that the woman who consented to a search of an apartment for which she possessed the keys might have lacked authority to give consent. Id. at
2797. Therefore, from a constitutional perspective, further inquiry could not reasonably have
been required in this case as distinguished from other cases in which a consensual search is
carried out.
54. Many lower courts have taken a comparable approach in connection with a suspect's
ambiguous statements that may reflect a desire to-assert the Mirandaright to counsel. When a
suspect in custody makes such an equivocal or unclear statement, a police officer is not free to
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police officers acting without judicial authorization should be certain of
the scope of the permission on which they predicate a search.
Moreover, if the reasonableness of a consensual search must be
gauged from someone's perspective, there is no constitutional reason to
select that of the police officer. The reasonableness of the search might
just as well be assessed from the suspect's point of view.55 The Court
might have asked what a reasonable person in the suspect's position
would have intended to convey when he gave general consent or what a
reasonable person would have expected the police to do after general
consent was given. The invocation of the police officer's perspective
rather than that of the suspect cannot be attributed to anything intrinsic
in the concept of "reasonableness." This perspective, however, is more
likely to warrant upholding a search. Even if, from the suspect's or the
trial court's perspective, the suspect's authorization should have been interpreted narrowly, it may nevertheless have been reasonable from the

officer's perspective to construe the suspect's consent differently, and
more broadly.
Just as the "reasonableness" standard does not require adopting as
the constitutional standard the perspective of a reasonable police officer,
the reasonable-officer standard, in turn, did not require upholding the
consensual search in Jimeno. Although this standard may provide meaningful guidance when the officer who conduts the search is unaware of
the circumstances that seem to make a consensual search unreasonable,5 6
ignore the statement based on his own belief, however reasonable it might be, that the defendant did not in fact mean to invoke the right. Rather, before questioning the suspect, the officer
must clarify the defendant's intentions and ascertain that the defendant does not want a lawyer. See, e.g., United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1985); Nash v. Esteile, 597 F.2d 513, 518 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
55. The Court has employed the suspect's perspective to determine whether a police officer's encounter with a suspect amounted to a "seizure." See, eg., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (defining seizure to be when, "in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave"). When an individual has been "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment was an
issue in two recent decisions-Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991), discussed infra
notes 111-39 and accompanying text, and California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550-51
(1991), discussed infra notes 140-64 and accompanying text.
56. The Court's approach makes clear that the "reasonableness" of a consensual search
must be determined wholly from the officer's perspective, independent of circumstances
outside the officer's knowledge. Among other things, the decision portends the Court's elimination of the subjective aspect of voluntary consent that the Court required almost two decades ago in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). In Schneckloth the
Court held that to be valid, a consent to search must be "voluntary," and that the voluntariness of consent is governed by the standard previously developed under the Due Process
Clause to assess the admissibility of confessions. Id at 223-29. The ad hoc "voluntariness"
standard turns not only on whether the police engaged in overreaching conduct, but also on
subjective characteristics of the accused, such as the suspect's level of intelligence and emo-
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it provides inadequate guidance when, as in Jimeno, the question is
whether the officer acted reasonably in light of the information he possessed. The concept of "reasonableness" as employed by the Court in
Jimeno fails because it has no substantive content. It does, of course,
dictate what facts courts must consider in assessing whether an officer
exceeded the scope of consent: all the circumstances known to the officer
relating to the consensual search. The concept of reasonableness determines the style of the court's decision by suggesting that the relevant
circumstances must be considered ad hoe, rather than through categorical rules. But, as used in Jimeno, the concept does not say how the facts
should be taken into account. What determines the "reasonableness" of
an officer's interpretation of general consent? The judge's own view of
what is or is not reasonable based on the judge's own sensibilities and
(usually limited) experience? If the benchmark is to be something objective, and not just the personal predilections of individual judges, the majority fails to say so.
Even looking at Jimeno independently of the Court's four other
1991 search-and-seizure decisions, therefore, one might question whether
the considerations described in the opinion were the ones that actually
influenced the Court to reject the defendant's claim. In its opinion, the
Court asked whether the officer reasonably construed Jimeno's consent,
but did not explain why the constitutional principle of reasonableness
required the Court to frame the question that way. The Court then
judged the officer's construction of the suspect's general consent to have
been reasonable, but never enunciated its standard for measuring the reasonableness of an officer's interpretation of a suspect's permission. One
might surmise that the result in Jimeno is in reality the product of the
majority's belief that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted narrowly, not of legal analysis, and that the Court invoked "reasonableness"
to avoid having to explain its genuine reason for reaching a result that
favored the prosecution. Looking at Jimeno alone, however, one cannot
say for sure. It may be, instead, that the Court's omissions were simply
tional and psychological stability, of which the police would not be aware at the time of their
encounter. .rd. at 226.
A consensual search is not necessarily permissible under Schneckloth simply because the
police reasonably understand the suspect's consent to be voluntary. Id. at 229. If the suspect
is peculiarly susceptible to pressure, for reasons entirely beyond the officers' ken, his consent
may later be deemed involuntary, and therefore ineffective. Id. This approach is, of course,
inconsistent with the view in Jimeno that the constitutionality of a search turns solely on the
objectively reasonable understanding of the officers who conduct it, without regard to the subjective understanding of the person who gives consent. Jimeno signals a possible reconsideration of the voluntariness standard for consensual searches and the elimination of the subjective
aspect of that standard.
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the product of poor drafting, or of the misguided belief that the unstated
reasons for its analytic choices were obvious. Only when Jimeno is
viewed in relation to the Term's other Fourth Amendment decisions can
it be said that the Court's reasoning was not simply sparse, but
pretextual.
B.

The "Automobile Exception" The Triumph of Policy Over
Precedent

Californiav. Acevedo, 57 the Court's second decision delineating the
proper scope of warrantless searches, stands jurisprudentially in marked
contrast to Jimeno. In Jimeno the Court rejected a state court's "perse
rule""8 designed to provide guidance to police officers who conduct consensual searches-the Florida Supreme Court's requirement that an officer clarify the scope of intent before searching containers 5 9 -in favor of
an ad hoc, fact-intensive inquiry into the "reasonableness" of police conduct.' Only one week later, five of the justices who had been in the
majority in Jimeno issued an opinion in Acevedo that considered the need
for clarity compelling enough to warrant overruling the Court's own
precedent.
Acevedo, coincidentally, also involved the discovery of narcotics in a
paper bag in a car. Police officers saw Acevedo enter an apartment into
which the officers knew a second suspect had just brought packages of
marijuana.6 A few minutes later, the officers saw Acevedo leaving the
apartment with a brown paper bag about the size of one of the marijuana
packages.6 2 After Acevedo placed the package in the trunk of his car
and began to drive away, the officers pulled him over, searched the trunk,
opened the bag, and discovered marijuana.6 3 The California appellate
court held that the marijuana was inadmissible because the police should
have obtained a warrant before opening the bag." 4
The state court's determination was a straightforward application of
the Supreme Court's prior Fourth Amendment case law. Over the past
four decades, the Supreme Court had consistently espoused the view
that, in the absence of a valid warrant, a search or seizure is presump57. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
58. Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803 (1991).
59.
60.
61.
62.

See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1984.
Id

63. Id at 1984-85.
64. People v. Acevedo, 216 Cal. App. 3d 586, 590, 265 Cal. Rptr. 23, 25 (1989), rev'd sub
nom. California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
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tively unreasonable.6 5 Before-the-fact determinations of probable cause
by neutral and detached judicial officers are thought to provide greater
protection against unreasonable invasions of privacy than on-the-spot determinations made by officers "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 6 6 The requirement of a warrant is
dispensable only in exceptional situations in which some exigency "support[s] the need for an immediate search." 6 In Acevedo the search of the
car was justified by a recognized exception, but the search of the paper
bag found inside the car was not.
The question before the Court, therefore, was whether to expand the
scope of the previously recognized "automobile exception" to permit
warrantless searches like the one conducted in Acevedo. Under the "automobile exception," a vehicle may be searched without a warrant when
probable cause exists to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. 68
When it first recognized the exception sixty-seven years earlier in Carroll
65. As Justice Stewart stated in his opinion for the Court in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id. at 357 (footnotes omitted).
Although the Court has expanded the exceptions to the warrant requirement in both number
and scope in the intervening years, it has continued to cite Katz for the principle that a warrant
is generally required to conduct a search. See, eg., Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1991; Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-24 (1989). At the same time, however,
the presumption has been challenged by some justices and commentators, including, most recently, Justice Scalia in a separate opinion in Acevedo. See Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992-93
(Scalia, J., concurring). See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General ReasonablenessInterpretationof the FourthAmendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 119, 119
(1989) (arguing that the general warrant requirement is "by no means compelled by the language of the amendment itself").
66. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (footnote omitted).
67. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 (1977). As Justice Scalia noted in his
concurring opinion inAcevedo, however, the exceptions to the warrant requirement are becoming increasingly less exceptional. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1473-74
(1985)) (noting that in 1985 a commentator catalogued nearly 20 exceptions to the warrant
requirement, and identifying two other exceptions that the Court since has recognized).
68. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 149 (1925). See generally Martin R. Gardner, Searches and Seizures ofAutomobiles
and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerationsin a Post-Ross World, 62 NEB. L.
Rv. 1, 3 (1983) (assessing the possibility of the Court further narrowing Fourth Amendment
warrant requirements); Lewis R. Katz, United States v. Ross: Evolving Standardsfor WarrantlessSearches,74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172, 208 (1983) (suggesting that the Court
might extend the automobile exception to a more general public place/probable cause exception).
At the time of the decision in Carroll,searches could lawfully be conducted only for
contraband or instrumentalities of a crime, and not for mere evidence. See Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). This was true of searches pursuant to a warrant, as well as
warrantless searches. The rule against searches for "mere evidence" was eliminated, however,
by the Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1967).
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v. United States,6 9 the Court justified it by citing the niobility of vehicles,
which quickly can be driven out of the jurisdiction while officers leave
the scene to obtain a search warrant.70 That justification is far less compelling today, since police officers generally can immobilize an automobile and obtain judicial authorization by radio without leaving the scene.
In more recent cases, therefore, the Court has identified an additional
justification: the diminished expectation of privacy that individuals have
in their automobiles, which are operated in public, are extensively regulated, and are rarely used as a "residence or as the repository of personal
effects." 71 The automobile exception is categorical, applying even when
the underlying justifications are not implicated. Thus, a warrantless
search may be conducted when the particular vehicle is immobile,7" or
when its owner demonstrates some expectation of privacy by using the
vehicle as a residence.7 3
The Court defined and eventually expanded the scope of the automobile exception in a series of decisions leading up to Acevedo. In the
late 1970s the Court in United States v. Chadwick74 and Arkansas v.
Sanders75 appeared to define limits of the automobile exception. In each
case, the police had probable cause to believe the person they were following was carrying narcotics-in one case, inside a foot locker,7 6 in the
other, inside a suitcase.7 7 Had they seized the container before it was
placed in a vehicle, the Court held, the police in each case would have
needed a warrant to open it lawfully. The warrant requirement remained
even though the container was incidentally placed in a vehicle before it
was seized. Once seized, the Court reasoned, the container was immobile, so no urgency justified dispensing with judicial authorization. 78 The
69. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
70. Id at 151-54.
71. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974) (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.);
accord California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 (1985). For criticisms of this contemporary
justification, see Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warraht Requirement,
19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 603, 629-38 (1982); Katz, supra note 68, at 199.
72. See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam); see also Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-52 (1970) (finding no difference between "seizing and holding a car
before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and... carrying out an immediate
search without a warrant").
73. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 (1985).
74. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
75. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
76. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 3.
77. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 755.
78. Id. at 763-64; Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. An additional, unstated concern may have
been that applying the automobile exception to these cases would have encouraged police officers to evade the warrant requirement: instead of procuring a warrant when they identified a
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rule that containers in cars may be seized but not searched reflected a
recognition of the heightened expectation of privacy that people enjoy in
handbags, suitcases, and similar containers, which, unlike vehicles, are
customarily used as repositories of personal effects.7 9
The Court's apparent intention to hold the line on the automobile
exception regarding containers and vehicles seemed to continue in a case
in which, unlike Chadwick and Sanders, the police were not tracking
containers that happened to be placed in vehicles, but were tracking vehicles in which containers happened to be found. In Robbins v. California8 0 the Court set forth a categorical rule based on the heightened
expectation of privacy in closed containers: a closed container found in a
car has the same constitutional protection as a container found anywhere
else." l The next year, however, the expansion of the automobile exception began: the Court overruled Robbins, although not Chadwick and
Sanders. It held in United States v. Ross82 that if police had probable
cause to believe evidence will be found somewhere in a vehicle, but it is
not known precisely where, then the "automobile exception" permits the
police to search without a warrant every area in which the evidence is
likely to be found, including closed containers discovered inside the
8 3

vehicle.

Prior to Ross, police knew in any given situation what they could
and could not properly do when they had probable cause to believe evidence was contained in a vehicle: they could search the vehicle and they
could seize packages, but they could not open them. After Ross, critics
of that decision argued, proper procedure was illogical.8 4 If, on the one
hand, the police had probable cause to believe evidence was somewhere
in the car, but they did not know precisely where, they could search the
car and all the containers inside it. If, on the other hand, they knew
which container the evidence was in, the officers could seize that
container but could not search it without a warrant. In other words, the
container they believed to contain evidence, officers could wait until the container was placed
in a vehicle and then seize and search it without a warrant.
79. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762; Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. The Court has recognized that
containers are entitled to less protection under the Fourth Amendment when it can be inferred
from their outward appearance that they contain evidence of a crime. See, e.g., Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 750-51 (1983); Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13.
80. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
81. Id at 425.
82. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).

83. Id. at 825.
84. See California v. Acevedo, Ill S. Ct. 1982, 1989 (1991) (citing commentary); see also
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 79[C][4] (1991) (providing

examples).
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police were better off with less knowledge than more-an apparent
anomaly."5 Assuming they could remember and grasp the lines drawn
by the Supreme Court's decisions, police officers would have to judge
whether they knew enough, but not too much, before conducting a
search of containers in a car.
In Acevedo the Court overruled Chadwick and Sanders, finding them
to be administratively unworkable, and thus further expanded the scope
of the automobile exception. Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun,
who had dissented in Chadwick, 6 criticized prior case law as drawing a
"curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally
turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally
turns up in an automobile."8 " In its place, the Court drew a more inclusive line: when the police have probable cause to believe that evidence is
anywhere in a vehicle-whether or not in a particular container-they
may search all parts of the vehicle and all containers in which evidence is
likely to be discovered. 8
The Court provided several justifications for its decision. First, it
suggested, paradoxically, that its decision would be more protective of
privacy than the prior case law, which might have led police officers to
conduct unnecessarily broad vehicle searches.8 9 When police had probable cause to believe contraband was somewhere in a vehicle, but they
were not sure precisely where, they might search the entire vehicle rather
than just containers in which the contraband was most likely to be found.
They presumably would do so not out of a desire to be thorough but to
dissuade the judge at a suppression hearing from later inferring that the
police knew more than they in fact did about the precise location of the
contraband. Such conduct, of course, would reflect not only a subtle
grasp of the Fourth Amendment case law but also a particular sensitivity
to, and concern for, the evidentiary determinations that might eventually
85. In Acevedo both the majority and the concurrence viewed this as anomalous, see
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1990-91; id. at 1993 (Scalia, J., concurring), but the anomaly is more
apparent than real. Invariably, when police are authorized to undertake searches or seizures
based on incomplete knowledge, more complete information may eliminate the justification for
their action. For example, police may carry out a protective search of a house in which an
arrest occurs when they have reason to believe someone is inside, but not when they know for
certain that the house is empty. See Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (1990). Likewise,
in the course of a Terry stop, police may pat down a suspect whom they reasonably believe
may be armed, but not a suspect whom they know for certain is unarmed. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The distinction in the law prior to Acevedo was similarly premised on
the officer's degree of knowledge.
86. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,17 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. at 1991.
88. Id.
89. Id at 1989.
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be made at a suppression hearing. Nevertheless, the Court characterized
the possibility of this conduct as "not far fetched." 9
At the same time, the Court minimized the extent to which Chadwick and Sanders actually protected privacy. It reasoned that a warrant
routinely will be issued in "the overwhelming majority of cases" in which

containers are seized pursuant to a valid warrantless search of an automobile;91 that in many cases the seized containers could be searched
92
without a warrant under another exception to the warrant requirement;
and that the search of closed containers is far less intrusive than the
slashing of upholstery permitted in Carroll,the earliest case to recognize
the "automobile exception." 93
The Court's principal justification, however, was rooted in the

shared administrative interests of the police and the judiciary. "The
Chadwick-Sanders rule," according to Justice Blackmun, "confused
courts and police officers"'9 4 and was thus "the antithesis of a' "clear and

unequivocal" guideline.' ,g Despite the assumption underlying its initial point-that officers have so mastered the subtleties of the "automo-

bile exception" that they will conduct overbroad searches in anticipation
of suppression hearings-the Court explained that officers who are justi-

fied in searching an automobile are often uncertain about the permissible
scope of their search. Therefore, "it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule
to govern automobile searches." 9 6 Indeed, in the Court's view, the inter-

est in clarity was sufficiently compelling to overcome not only the general
presumption against the constitutionality of warrantless searches-a presumption that the majority opinion specifically reaffirmed 97-- but also the
90. Id. at 1988.
91. d at 1989.
92. Id The Court pointed out that under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981),
containers found within the passenger compartment of an automobile may be searched incident to an arrest of an occupant of the automobile. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1989 (citing Belton,
453 U.S. at 460). This exception would not have applied in Acevedo, however, because the
paper bag in that case was inside the trunk of the car, not the passenger compartment.
93. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. at 1989.
94. Id.
95. Id at 1990 (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486, 490 (1990)).
96. Id at 1991.
97. Id. (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)). Although he agreed with
the Court's result, Justice Scalia took issue with the majority's reaffirmation of the general rule
that warrants are required for a constitutional search and seizure and, therefore, declined to
join the majority opinion. Id at 1992-93 (Scalia, J., concurring). In his view, the warrant
requirement had spawned decades of inconsistent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at
1992 (Scalia, J.,concurring). The rules regarding automobile searches were only several
among many anomalous ones. Id (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Moreover, over time the warrant
requirement had been "riddled with exceptions," many announced in decisions that, if paying
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"important purposes" underlying the doctrine of stare decisis. 98
Even if Acevedo is viewed in isolation, there are several reasons why
one might question the genuineness of the Court's avowed reliance on the
need for clarity. The first is provided by Justice Stevens in a dissenting
lip service to the requirement, did not genuinely take it seriously. Id. at 1992-93 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
To restore doctrinal order to the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia advocated judging all
searches by the standard of "reasonableness." Id. at 1993 (Scalia, J., concurring). A warrant
would not generally be necessary to make a search reasonable, except in situations resembling
those in which a warrant was required at common law. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). In his
view, the search in Acevedo's case was lawful "because the search of a closed container,
outside a privately owned building, with probable cause to believe that the container contains
contraband, and when it in fact does contain contraband, is not one of those searches whose
Fourth Amendment reasonableness depends upon a warrant." Id. at 1994 (Scalia, J., concurring). Curiously, under this formulation, the propriety of a search seems to be justified partly
on the basis of what the search reveals.
Given Justice Scalia's identification of "reasonableness" as the overarching principle of
Fourth Amendment adjudication, one might have expected him to reject the majority's pragmatic concern for administrative expediency. As the Jimeno decision illustrates, the Fourth
Amendment standard of "reasonableness" seems to require the rejection of categorical rules in
favor of ad hoc assessments of police investigative conduct. Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801,
1803-04 (1991). Justice Scalia, however, did not advocate the rejection of categorical rules.
He simply rejected the particular categorical rules adopted over the preceding three decades
relating to the warrant requirement. Instead of the majority's modest refusal to adhere to the
doctrine of stare decisis with respect to a narrow issue of Fourth Amendment law, he favored a
wholesale rejection of the principal doctrinal premise underlying the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1993-94 (Scalia, J., concurring). With it would
follow a rejection of virtually the entire body of Fourth Amendment law, presumably to be
replaced by new categorical rules that, taken together, would be less confusing, more "reasonable," and, not incidentally, less demanding upon criminal investigators. For example, the
particular categorical rule that should have decided the Acevedo case, in Justice Scalia's view,
was that a warrantless search of a closed container is permissible whenever there is "probable
cause to believe that the container contains contraband." Id. at 1994 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia never explained why that rule was more "reasonable" than the rules developed
over the previous decades by shifting majorities of the Court. Nor did he explain how invoking
the principle of "reasonableness" would enable the Court to develop a set of rules that are any
more clear and less anomalous than those premised on a "warrant requirement."
98. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1991 ("Although we have recognized firmly that the doctrine of
stare decisis serves profoundly important purposes in our legal system, this Court has overruled a prior case on the comparatively rare occasion when it has bred confusion or been a
derelict or led to anomalous results.").
The doctrine of stare decisis serves three general functions: it relieves courts of the burden of reexamining the merits of relevant precedent, it enhances stability in the law, and it
promotes public respect for judicial decisionmaking. On the role and importance of stare decisis, see generally Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A CriticalHistory, 1988
Wisc. L. REv. 771 (discussing importance of stare decisis); Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis:
Precedent and Principle in Constitutional.Adjudication,73 CORNELL L. REv. 401 (1988)
(same); William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLuM. L. REv. 735 (1949) (same); Anthony J.
Kronman, Precedentand Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990) (same); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723 (1988) (same). Cf
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint,44 REc. Ass'N B. CrrY N.Y. 813,
819-21 (1989) (discussing recent threats to stare decisis).
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opinion joined by Justice Marshall.9 9 Justice Stevens responded to the
majority opinion point by point, but gave particular attention to the
"confusion" the Court claimed was created by Chadwick and Sanders."
He explained at some length that no evidence supported the premise that
the police were in fact confused by the prior decisions. Although commentators critical of the decision in Ross predicted uncertainty for the
police, judicial decisions issued by lower courts in the intervening nine
years revealed no difficulty in complying with the prior rulings. 101
Even accepting Ross's potential for confusion, the rule announced in
Acevedo provides no remedy. Prior to Acevedo a defendant might have
argued that a search of a container was excessive under the "automobile
exception" because the police had probable cause to believe that evidence
was in the container and nowhere else. After Acevedo a defendant may
challenge a search of areas of the car other than the targeted container on
precisely the same ground. For example, if the officers in Acevedo had
searched the glove compartment of the car, or had searched containers in
the trunk other than the paper bag, Acevedo could have argued that the
search was excessive in scope.'1 2 To resolve this challenge, a court must
still ascertain precisely what the officers knew at the time of the

search. 103
Finally, the interest in clarity does not necessarily dictate a rule, like
the one announced in Acevedo, that is underprotective of individuals' interest in the privacy of their belongings. In striving for clarity, the Court
had the option to announce a different rule that was both more clear-cut
and more protective of privacy. Instead of holding that closed containers
may be searched like any other area of an automobile in which evidence
is likely to be discovered, the Court could have resurrected the shortlived rule of Robbins. Under Robbins, police officers had ample guidance
when they stopped a vehicle thought to contain evidence: closed contain99. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1994 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice White filed a separate,
one-sentence dissent. See id. (White, 3., dissenting) ("Agreeing as I do with most of Justice
Stevens' opinion and with the result he reaches, I dissent and would affirm the judgment
below.").
100. Id. at 1998-2001 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1999-2000 & n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. InAcevedo, the Court reaffirmed the principle that" '[p]robable cause to believe that a
container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a
search of the entire cab.' " Id. at 1991 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824
(1982)).
103. See id. ("The facts in the record reveal that the police did not have probable cause to
believe that contraband was hidden in any other part of the automobile and a search of the
entire vehicle would have been without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.").
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ers could never be searched under the "automobile exception."'"
Viewing the Acevedo decision alongside the earlier decision in
Jimeno one has even greater cause to question whether giving clear guidance to the police was anything more than a retrospective justification
for a predetermined outcome. In Jimeno the need for clarity was undeniable. Police officers assessing the scope of a suspect's general consent
under the open-ended standard of "reasonableness" are invariably at risk
that their decisions will later be rejected by reviewing courts. A categorical rule requiring officers to clarify a suspect's intentions would have
eliminated this risk, while facilitating judicial review of consent searches.
At the same time, in Jimeno there was no jurisprudential impediment to
adopting such a rule. No prior decisions addressed the scope of a suspect's general consent; the Court was writing on a blank slate. Moreover, the Court had not hesitated in the past to give content to the
"reasonableness" standard by adopting categorical rules, the warrant requirement and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement being two obvious examples. 10 5 Nevertheless, in Jimeno, as previously
noted, 10 6 the Court dismissed the interest in clarity, declining to add a
"superstructure"
to a
virtually
content-free
principle
of
"reasonableness." 07
In contrast, in Acevedo, the same Justices professed that the quest
for clarity was virtually determinative of the outcome. 0 8 Yet, in that
case, the interest in clarity did not seem particularly compelling, while
the interest in stare decisis strongly militated against an expansion of the
automobile exception. One would have thought that if the interest in
clarity was unworthy of serious consideration in Jimeno, then a fortiori it
would have been rejected out of hand in Acevedo, rather than being invoked to sweep aside precedent."co
The juxtaposition of these two cases demonstrates that, as employed
by the Court, clarity is not a value-neutral administrative consideration
given equivalent weight in all search-and-seizure cases. It is, rather, a
consideration invoked only when it will justify a narrow constitutional
interpretation. The Acevedo Court's preference for law enforcement over
individual privacy interests dictated not only the choice between two categorical rules, each of which would have eliminated the murkiness of the
existing law, but also the very choice of administrative clarity as a con104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 44.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1804 (1991).
See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991).
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sideration in interpreting the scope of a warrantless search. Taken together, Acevedo and Jimeno demonstrate that the interest in clarity
moves the Court in only one direction: in favor of the prosecution. 110
III.

A.

WARRANTLESS SEIZURES

Seizing Bus Passengers: The Triumph of Precedent Over Policy
In Florida v. Bostick" I the Court found persuasive the precedent

and policy considerations it had dismissed in Acevedo. While in Acevedo
the Court deemed the merits of drawing bright-line rules sufficiently
compelling to warrant overruling precedent, in Bostick the weight of precedent was said to preclude categorical rules. This reordering seems es-

pecially unprincipled for two reasons. First, the precedent relied on in
Bostick was far less relevant to the issue under consideration than that in
Acevedo, in which the Court overruled prior decisions precisely on point.

Second, although the Court chose an ad hoc approach in Bostick and a
categorical one in Acevedo, the need1 2for clear guidance was far greater in

the former case than in the latter.'
In Bostick two officers of the Fort Lauderdale County sheriff's department boarded a bus en route from Miami to Atlanta, approached the
defendant without any articulable grounds for suspicion, "13 and asked to
inspect his ticket and identification. 4 Bostick agreed, and the inspection turned up nothing unusual.'
The officers then stated that they
were looking for illegal drugs and asked Bostick's permission to search
110. The Court all but made this point explicitly in McNeil v. Wisconsin, Ill S. Ct. 2204
(1991), a confession case decided two weeks after Acevedo. The Court in McNeil rejected the
argument that, as a matter of sound policy, invocations of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel should be construed to invoke the Miranda right to counsel as well. Id. at 2208-09. In
his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia countered that the proposed rule would undermine
legitimate law-enforcement efforts: "Since the ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is
not an evil but an unmitigated good, society would be the loser." Id. at 2210. Moreover,
although a bar on police questioning after the Sixth Amendment right attaches would have the
virtue of clarity, "the police do not need our assistance to establish such a guideline; they are
free, if they wish, to adopt it on their own." Id. at 2211. Clear guidelines are appropriate, he
explained, "only when they guide sensibly, and in a direction we are authorized to go." Id.
111. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 129-30.
113. The Court gave no reason why the officers decided to talk to Bostick. See Bostick v.
State, 510 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Letts, J., dissenting in part) ("Eyeing the
passengers, the officers, admittedly without articulable suspicion, picked out the defendant
passenger and asked to inspect his ticket and identification."), aff'd, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154-55
(Fla. 1989), rev'd sub nor. Florida v. Bostick, IlI S. Ct. 2382 (1991); quotedin Bostick, 111 S.
Ct. at 2384-85).
114. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2385.
115. Id.
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his luggage. He consented." 6 The search of one of Bostick's bags revealed cocaine, which was used to support his conviction for possession.11 The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that
Bostick had been illegally seized when he consented to the search."1 ,
The United States Supreme Court remanded the case, holding not
that the questioning on the bus was a reasonable seizure but that it was
not a seizure at all, and thus not subject to the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment. 9 In her opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor interpreted the Florida court's opinion as having adopted a per se rule that
questioning passengers at random on a bus is always a "seizure." ' 120 That
categorical rule was improper. 12 ' Rather, the proper test was whether,
considering "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter ... the
police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the
person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise termi22
nate the encounter."

1

The Court reasoned that "a seizure does not occur simply because a
1 23
police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions."
Moreover, the mere fact that the questioning occurs in a bus does not
mean that the individual has been seized. Although prior case law indicated that a seizure occurs when a reasonable person believes that he is
not "free to leave," the Court rejected that standard in favor of "the
principle that those words were intended to capture"-namely, seizure
depends on "the coercive effect of an encounter." 24 Since a bus passenger's inevitable lack of mobility is a product of his voluntary decision to
travel by bus, not the officers' conduct, it is not an appropriate measure
of the coerciveness of the encounter.1 2 5 The test should focus not on
whether the passenger reasonably feels free to leave, but on whether he
reasonably feels free to decline the officers' requests-which he ought to
"so long as the officers do not convey a message that compliance with
their requests is required." '2 6 The Court was skeptical that Bostick had
116. Id
117. Id.
118. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla.1989), rev'd sub nom. Florida v.Bostick,
111 S.Ct. 2382 (1991).
119. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2389.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2386.
124. Id. at 2387.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2388.
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been seized under this standard,12 7 but rather than resolve the question it
remanded the case to the state court for reconsideration. 128
For police officers, the Bostick seizure test provides even less guidance than the Jimeno scope-of-consent test. Since Bostick's ad hoc test
views the officer's conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person in
the suspect's position, whether the suspect had been seized may turn on
contextual circumstances known to the passenger alone. 29 Moreover,
the Bostick standard for assessing the total circumstances is so vague and
subjective that police officers encountering a suspect on a bus cannot confidently predict how their conduct later will be evaluated by a judge in a
130
suppression hearing.
In contrast, the approach urged by Justice Marshall in a dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens provided far clearer
guidance. Justice Marshall argued that suspicionless police sweeps of
buses bear all the elements of coercion and unjustified intrusion of general warrants, 13 1 and thus violate the core values of the Fourth Amendment.1 32 In his view, a passenger in Bostick's position would not have
felt free to terminate the encounter with the officers.' 33 In light of the
officers' intimidating show of authority, a passenger could neither have
obstinately remained silent nor left the bus, which was at an intermediate
point in a long journey.' 34 At a minimum, Justice Marshall contended,
police officers in such a situation should be required to advise passengers
"of their right to decline to be questioned, to dispel the aura of coercion
35
and intimidation that pervades such encounters."'1
127. Id. at 2389.
128. Id.
129. Suppose, for example, that before the officers reached Bostick, a fellow passenger
whispered to him that those who refused to cooperate with the authorities would be arrested.
Undoubtedly, a reasonable person in Bostick's situation would then have felt unable to resist
the officers' subsequent requests, regardless of how benign the officers' conduct might have
appeared to be from their own perspective.
130. Police anticipation of suppression hearings was a major concern of the Court in
Acevedo. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85, 90.
131. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2389 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of "general
warrants" and "writs of assistance," the two practices against which the Fourth Amendment
historically was designed to protect, see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. Rnv. 349, 362 (1974).
132. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2389 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. Id at 2393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Id.(Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2394-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The categorical rule adopted by the state
court and defended by Justice Marshall in dissent was supported by a far stronger administrative interest than the rule embraced in Acevedo. This is true because the rule rejected in
Acevedo was far easier for officers to follow than the rule adopted in Bostick. Under the law
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The majority's purported reason for eschewing a categorical rule in
Bostick seems anomalous in light of Acevedo. The Court averred that its
ad hoe standard was compelled by "a long, unbroken line of decisions
dating back more than 20 years." 136 Indeed, the Court emphasized several times in the opinion that its approach was dictated by the need for
fidelity to precedent.1" 7 Yet none of the precedents on which the Court
relied in Bostick was precisely on point. The Court had never previously
analyzed encounters between police officers and suspects that took place
in such close quarters that suspects would not ordinarily feel free to leave

for reasons apart from the officer's conduct-for example, in buses in
transit. Moreover, as the majority recognized, the result in Bostick was

not dictated by the general standard, enunciated in previous cases, for
determining whether an encounter with the police amounted to a seizure,
but rather by "the principle" that the previous standard was "intended to
capture." 13 8 If the Court in Acevedo was free to overrule precedent to
promote clear rules, it is hard to see why the same Court, three weeks

later, would consider itself bound by a principle that was, at best, implicit
in factually distinguishable cases.
Viewed in juxtaposition to the reasoni'g inAcevedo, the Court's reasoning in Bostick cannot seriously be regarded as an accurate reflection of
the Court's deliberative process. It is hard to imagine that the Court felt
influenced by precedent to reject a clear rule when, three weeks earlier,
prior to Acevedo, an officer could search containers in a car if he had probable cause to believe
evidence was somewhere in the car, but not if he knew that the evidence he was seeking was in
a specific container. The propriety of a search of containers in a vehicle was not difficult to
determine in advance because it turned entirely on a straightforward assessment of information
known to the officer. The ability of well-trained officers to conform to the law was reflected in
the sparsity of published cases in which officers innocently exceeded the scope of a proper
search under the "automobile exception."
The rule Justice Marshall urged in Bostick also seems to have a firmer foundation both in
experience and in theory. As a matter of experience, the rule-that the random questioning of
a bus passenger amounts to a seizure-was warranted by the generalization that a passenger in
such an encounter will feel coerced, a generalization recognized by many other judges in similar cases. See id. at 2390-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In contrast, the categorical rule in
Acevedo is rooted in a 67-year-old generalization about the mobility of automobiles. Yet, in an
era when police easily may impound or tow vehicles, that generalization seems far less valid.
As a matter of interpretive theory, it would have made more sense to adopt a categorical rule
in Bostick to define "seizure," a comparatively concrete term, than it did in Acevedo to define
"reasonable," an open-textured concept.
136. L at 2388.
137. See id. ("[Tjoday's decision follows logically from... [prior] decisions and breaks no
new ground."); id. at 2387 ("This formulation follows logically from prior cases and breaks no
new ground."); see also id at 2385 (indicating that the Court's purpose in reviewing the case
was "to determine whether the Florida Supreme Court's per se rule is consistent with our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence").
138. Id. at 2387.
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the need for clarity purportedly compelled it to overrule well-established
precedent. The result is more plausibly explained by a consideration
only briefly alluded to in the Bostick opinion itself: the Court's preference for the societal interest in having suspects provide "voluntary cooperation" to criminal investigators 1 39 over the interest of individuals in
being free from coercive encounters with the police.
B.

Seizing Fleeing Suspects: The Triumph of Interpretive Principle
Over Precedent and Policy

California v. Hodari D. 14o also considered when an individual is
"seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This time, the
Court's narrow view of the protections of the Fourth Amendment was
explained neither by precedent, which its opinion took pains to distinguish, nor by the policy favoring clear guidance, which its opinion discounted. Instead, the Court invoked an interpretive principle-that the
meaning of the constitutional term should be governed by the common
law. 141

The defendant in Hodari D. was one of several young men on a
street in a high-crime area of Oakland who fled an approaching unmarked patrol car. One officer chased Hodari, who tossed away a rock of
crack cocaine just before he was caught. The cocaine was recovered, and
a search of Hodari turned up a pager and $130 in cash. 42
California's appellate court held that Hodari had been "seized" by
the pursuing officer. Because the State conceded that the officer lacked
"reasonable suspicion" to justify a Terry stop, the cocaine should have
139. See id at 2389 ("The Fourth Amendment... does not proscribe voluntary cooperation."). The Court's recognition of the importance of this interest, which also appears to underlie the decision in Jimeno, was addressed at greater length in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 11 S.
Ct. 2204 (1991). In that case the Court declined to adopt a rule that once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches with respect to pending charges, police officers may not initiate
questioning about unrelated charges. The Court explained in part: "Since the ready ability to
obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good, society would be the
loser." Id. at 2210. Likewise, in a dissenting opinion in another confession case, Minnick v.
Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1991), Justice Scalia gave considerable attention to this interest. In
his view, a voluntary confession is " 'inherently desirable' " both for society and "for the
wrongdoer himself... because it advances the goals of both 'justice and rehabilitation.'" Id
at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n.23 (1974)) (emphasis added). It was unintended
irony, perhaps, that Justice Scalia said that confessions should be encouraged as an aid to a
criminal's rehabilitation in a case in which the confession was used to procure a murder conviction and a sentence of death.
140. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
141. Id at 1549-51, 1550 n.2.
142. Id. at 1549.
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been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure. 14 3 The only issue
before the Supreme Court was whether Hodari had been seized. 144
In an opinion joined by six other justices, Justice Scalia held that
Hodari's Fourth Amendment right had not been violated because a suspect in flight is never "seized" under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of physical restraint. 14 He distinguished two situations that would
constitute a seizure: when officers use physical restraint (even if the suspect struggles free) and when a suspect submits to a verbal assertion of
authority.1 46 This interpretation was warranted both by the constitutional language, since the term "seizure" implies the taking of physical
possession, and by the elements of a common-law arrest, which include
the use of physical force or restraint.1 47
In determining that Hodari had not been seized, the Court minimized the importance of providing police officers with clear guidance
about the constitutionality of their prospective conduct, the very consideration that had been dispositive in Acevedo. As Justice Stevens explained in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall, under the
majority's approach the constitutionality of a police officer's conduct
turns not only on the officer's conduct in pursuing a suspect, but also on
the suspect's subjective reaction, which an officer cannot possibly predict.1 48 An officer's efforts may be subject to the Fourth Amendment if
the suspect responds but exempt if the suspect ignores the officer. As a
consequence, it is impossible for a police officer "'to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth
Amendment.' "149 In response, the Court simply expressed confidence
that police officers will be unaffected by this uncertainty because they will
always proceed on the expectation that suspects will respond to their
efforts. 150
The majority also declared itself unconstrained by precedent, the
same precedent found dispositive in Bostick. A line of decisions over the
143. See id. (describing unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1550-51.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1549-51.
148. Id. at 1560 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Stevens, I., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574
(1988)).
150. Id. at 1551. Justice Stevens, quoting Professor LaFave, argued to the contrary that"
'police would be encouraged to utilize a very threatening but sufficiently slow chase as an
evidence-gathering technique whenever they lack even the reasonable suspicion needed for a
Terry stop.' " Id. at 1559 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 9.2, at 61 (2d ed. Supp. 1991)).
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prior decade-the same decisions from which Justice O'Connor extracted the unstated principle said to dictate the outcome in Bostickdefined the applicable test as whether, "in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave." '51 Justice Stevens argued that Hodari was
"seized" under this test, since "the officer's show of force-taking the
form of a head-on chase-adequately conveyed the message that [he] was
not free to leave," just like "a command to 'freeze,' a warning shot, or the
sound of sirens accompanied by a patrol car's flashing lights."15 2 The
majority interpreted the "reasonable person" test to establish a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a seizure' 53 -an interpretation that
had no support in prior case law but that was, as Justice Stevens put it,
"nothing if not creative lawmaking."154
The majority based its interpretation on neither the policy in favor
of clarity nor precedent to determine whether a fleeing suspect has been
"seized" for constitutional purposes, but rather on the common law. 5
Wholly apart from whether the common law is an appropriate tool for
interpreting the term "seizure "-and Justice Stevens argued persuasively
that it was not 56-- the common law is not clear in this case. While, in
151. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), quoted with approvalin INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984); accord Chesternut,486 U.S. at 573; Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (plurality opinion of White, J.). See generally Wayne R. LaFave,
"Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and
Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 417, 420-26 (1984) (discussing what constitutes a
"seizure" and distinguishing "encounters" with police from "seizures"); Tracey Maclin, The
Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The FourthAmendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258, 1272-77 (1990) (discussing reasonableness test and substantial extension of rightto-inquire rule through reasonableness test); Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of
Seizure: The Conceptsof "Stop" and "Arrest" 43 OHIo ST.L.J. 771, 783-91 (1982) (discussing
Mendenhall and advantages and disadvantages of objective versus subjective test).
152. HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1559 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1551.
154. Id.at 1559 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
155. Id.at 1549-51.
156. Pointing to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which held that wiretaps were
"seizures," Justice Stevens contended that traditional common-law analysis was not controlling. HodariD., 111 S.Ct. at 1554-56 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The majority's response to this
argument was essentially that the common law controls those types of situations that were
within the contemplation of the Framers:
[W]e do not assert that... [common law] defines the limits of the term "seizure";
only that it defines the limits of a seizure of the person. What Katz stands for is the
proposition that items which could not be subject to seizure at common law (e.g.,
telephone conversations) can be seized under the Fourth Amendment. That is quite
different from saying that what constitutes an arrest (a seizure of the person) has
changed.
Id. at 1551 n.3.
The Court's attempt to distinguish Katz as a case dealing with "items which could not be
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the absence of physical contact, an officer's unauthorized attempt to restrain a suspect would not subject the officer to liability under the common law governing arrests, it would subject him to liability under the
common law governing attempted arrests.1 57 Justice Stevens argued that
the common-law distinction between arrest and attempted arrest, even if
important for common-law pleading purposes, was nevertheless unim15 8
portant for interpreting the Fourth Amendment.
In response to Justice Stevens' argument that the common law does
not dictate any particular outcome in this case, the majority answered
that, as applied to individuals rather than objects, the term "seizure" can
be read no more broadly than the common-law term "arrest." 159 In its
view, an attempted arrest at common law would be equivalent to "an
attempted seizure," which is not proscribed by the language of the
Fourth Amendment."e This response seems more like a post hoc rationalization than a determinative reason. The term "seizure" in the Fourth
Amendment is unquestionably more inclusive than a common-law
"arrest." For example, unlike the term "arrest," the term "seizure" has
always been understood to apply to the taking of one's personal property
as well as one's person.1 6 1 There is no reason why "seizure" should not
be broader than "arrest" in other respects as well and apply to other
police conduct, including an attempted arrest, which interferes with an
individual's mobility in a manner prohibited at common law. Thus, use
of the common law in interpreting "seizure" does not restrict the Court
to use of only one common-law doctrine.
Given the uncertainty of the relevant common-law analogue, one
might again suspect that the Court's decision was dictated by something
other than the principle that common law determines the scope of the
term "seizure." The Court's cavalier rejection of both precedent and
clarity-considerations deemed dispositive in other Fourth Amendment
subject to seizure at common law" seems less than persuasive. In Katz the items "seized" were
conversations. Conversations could be overheard by a different method--eavesdropping-that
was condemned as a nuisance at common law. Katz, 389 U.S. at 366 (Black, J. dissenting).
Therefore, as Justice Black argued in his dissenting opinion in Katz, wiretapping would not be
subject to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment if the scope of that provision was restricted
by the common law, as Justice Black believed it should be. Id at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
The Court's decision in Katz stood for nothing if not a rejection of Justice Black's viewresurrected by Justice Scalia-that the common law governs the meaning of the term
"seizure."
157. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1553 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Rollin M. Perkins,
The Law ofArrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201, 201 & n.3 (1940)).
158. Id. at 1553-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1550-51.
160. Id. at 1550-51 n.2.
161. Id. at 1549-50.
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cases this Term162--bolsters that suspicion. A portion of the majority
opinion discussing policy considerations suggests that the Hodari1. decision was in fact dictated by a preference for promoting law enforcement. Observing that "compliance with police orders to stop should...
be encouraged," 161 the Court sounded a theme heard throughout the
Term's Fourth Amendment decisions: the law should be fashioned to
encourage cooperation with law enforcement authorities. 164 This consideration clearly explains the outcome in HodariD.; reliance on common
law does not.
C. JudicialDeterminations of Probable Cause: The Triumph of
Precedent Over Principle
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin 161 the Court addressed warrantless arrests in a civil context. Specifically, the Court faced the question whether an individual who has been arrested without a warrant has
a Fourth Amendment right to a prompt judicial determination of
whether there is probable cause to believe he has committed a crime. In
holding that the states could delay a probable cause hearing for up to two
days so that it could be combined with arraignment, 6 6 the Court expressly refused to be governed by the common law in its interpretation of
the right to be free from unreasonable seizures,167 even though three
weeks earlier the Court found the more ambiguous common law dispositive in HodariD. ,68 The Court also dismissed the concept of reasonableness as too vague to guide its decision,1 69 even though ten days later in
Jimeno reasonableness purportedly guided the Court. 170 Instead, the
majority's decision rested primarily
on implicit guidance it found in a
1 71
prior decision, Gerstein v. Pugh.
The requirement of a prompt probable cause determination for de162. See discussions of Acevedo, supra text accompanying notes 94-98, and Bostick, supra
text accompanying notes 123-26.
163. HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1551.
164. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
165. 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991).
166. Id. at 1670.
167. Id at 1669.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 145-47, 155-61.
169. County of Riverside, 111 S.Ct. at 1669.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
171. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). For recent commentary on Gerstein, see Wendy L. Brandes,
Note, Post-ArrestDetention and the FourthAmendment: Refining the Standardof Gerstein v.
Pugh, 22 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 445, 452-57 (1989) (discussing Gerstein holding and
rationale and definition of "prompt" hearing); Jane H. Settle, Note, Williams v. Ward: Compromisingthe ConstitutionalRight to PromptDeterminationsof ProbableCause Upon Arrest, 74
MINN. L. Rav. 196, 206-09 (1989) (reviewing bases, including time required for police admin-
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fendants arrested without a warrant was first recognized sixteen years
earlier in Gerstein. 7 2 In that case, the Court struck down-a state procedure allowing individuals arrested without a warrant to be detained for
up to a month or longer without a judicial determination of probable
cause.173 The requirement of a "prompt" judicial determination of probable cause was premised on the common-law requirement that "an arrested person.., be brought before a justice of the peace shortly after
arrest."' 7 4 This judicial determination accommodated two competing interests: the state's interest in immediately taking custody of suspects and
the individual's interest in avoiding prolonged detention based on unfounded suspicions.' 75
County of Riverside addressed the issue of defining the reasonable
time period within which the Fourth Amendment requires that a probable cause hearing be held. More particularly, the question in County of
Riverside was whether it was proper to delay a probable cause hearing so
that it could be combined with the defendant's arraignment, which requires more preparation. A class of defendants arrested without warrants brought an action challenging the County of Riverside's practice of
combining probable cause determinations and arraignments.' 7 6 The
combination could cause delays of up to five days or more because,
although the statute required arraignment within two days of arrest, holidays and weekends were excluded from the calculation.' 7 7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found it improper to delay a
defendant's probable cause hearing until the latest time permitted by
statute for arraignment. Rather, a probable cause determination must be
made immediately after completion of booking, fingerprinting,
photographing, and similar administrative procedures incident to
arrest. 7 ' The court found that
these procedures require no more than
179
complete.
to
hours
thirty-six
istrative tasks and reasonableness of any delay, for courts' interpretation of maximum permissible detention time prior to probable cause hearing).
172. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125.
173. Id. at 106.
174. Id. at 114 (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 113-14. Two years later, in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), the
Court squarely held that a warrantless arrest on felony charges satisfies the Fourth Amendment as long as probable cause to arrest exists at the time of the arrest. Ia.at 423-24.
176. County of Riverside, 111 S.Ct. at 1665. The action sought both injunctive and declaratory relief. Id.
177. Id.
178. See McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991).
179. Id. Since a probable cause determination may be made in an exparte proceeding and
may be based upon hearsay, see, eg., FED. R. CRIM. P. 4, a probable cause determination
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The Supreme Court disagreed. In an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, the majority read Gerstein to permit a State to delay probable

cause determinations for up to two days in order to combine them with
arraignments.18 It relied on language in Gerstein allowing states flexibility to craft procedures to ensure prompt probable cause hearings. 1 Implicit in this "invitation to States to experiment" with their procedures is
the recognition that a hearing was not compelled immediately after a
suspect was "booked"; otherwise, there is no room for experimentation."' The need for flexibility therefore justifies "a reasonable post-

ponement of a probable cause determination" until arraignment.1 8 3 The
Court did recognize, however, that at some point a delayed probablecause determination can no longer be considered "prompt" under Ger-

stein. 84 Although "hesita[nt] to announce that the Constitution compels
a specific time limit," the Court nevertheless marked forty-eight hours as
the point after which delays caused by attempts to combine pre-indictment proceedings violate the Fourth Amendment. 8
alone could generally be obtained in well under 36 hours. Any police officer familiar with the
investigation could appear before a judicial officer and recount evidence thought sufficient to
establish probable cause.
180. County of Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1670.
181. Describing the earlier opinion in Gerstein, the Court stated:
We recognized that "state systems of criminal procedure vary widely" in the nature
and number of pretrial procedures they provide, and we noted that there is no single
"preferred" approach. We explained further that "flexibility and experimentation by
the States" with respect to integrating probable cause determinations was desirable
and that each State should settle upon an approach "to accord with [the] State's
pretrial procedure viewed as a whole."
Id. at 1668 (citation omitted) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975)).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1669.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1670. The Court stated that if a jurisdiction complied with the general requirement that hearings take place within 48 hours, it would be exempt from systemic challenges.
Id. When delay exceeds 48 hours, however, arrested defendants may bring systemic challenges, and the government must "demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other
extraordinary circumstance" thatjustifies the delay. Id. Neither intervening weekends nor the
desire to combine the probable cause hearing with arraignment will qualify as an extraordinary
circumstance. Id.
While allowing for individual, as opposed to systemic, challenges in cases in which probable-cause hearings occur within 48 hours of arrest, the Court held that an arrested defendant
has the burden of showing that any delay in such a case was unreasonable. Id Delay caused
by combining the probable cause hearing with arraignment would not be improper, as long as
the proceeding takes place within the 48-hour period. Id. The Court indicated that delay
would be improper, however, when it is "for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to
justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for
delay's sake," rather than attributable to paperwork and logistical problems. Id. Interestingly,
the Court did not address the one question that might affect the admissibility of incriminating
evidence in criminal cases: whether police officers may properly delay a probable cause hear-
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A comparison of the decision in County of Riverside with other
Fourth Amendment decisions of the Term once again compels skepticism that the Court engaged in principled decisionmaking and once again
suggests that the rationales invoked throughout the Term were nothing
more than post hoe explanations for the outcome of those cases. 186 The

other decisions also cast doubt on whether the Court in County of Riverside truly felt bound by precedent.
First, the decision underscores how uncompelling the Court's ra-

tionale was in HodariD.-that the common law of arrest requires rejecting a criminal defendant's claim of unreasonable seizure. In County
of Riverside the Court refused to be bound by common-law doctrine supportive of the arrested defendants' argument that their detention
amounted to an unreasonable seizure. As Justice Scalia argued in a
lengthy dissenting opinion,' 8 7 a series of prior judicial decisions established that under the common law governing unlawful arrests, "a person
arresting a suspect without a warrant [was required to] deliver the arrestee to a magistrate 'as soon as he reasonably can' "; the reasonableness of
any delay depended exclusively on the length of time necessary to reach a
magistrate.' 8 8 The majority's only response was to dismiss as a "vague
admonition" the requirement that an arresting officer arrange a judicial
ing to conduct an interrogation of the defendant that is designed, not to gather evidence to
establish probable cause for the defendant's arrest, but to gather additional evidence for trial.
186. County of Riverside also stands in somewhat ironic contrast to the decision several
weeks later in Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991), which held that a prejudgment
attachment of real estate violated due process in the absence of prior notice, opportunity for a
prior hearing, or some exigency. Id. at 2109. If a person is generally entitled to a hearing prior
to the seizure of his property, it would seem to follow that he is entitled to a hearing, if not
prior to the seizure of his person, then at the earliest available moment at which a post-arrest
hearing could be held. Like the Court's dictum in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610
(1991), the decision in Doehrsuggests that the Court has greater concern for property interests
than liberty interests. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
187. See County of Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1671 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
wrote a separate, one-paragraph dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, which
agreed with both Justice Scalia's conclusion and the holding of the court of appeals that a
probable cause hearing must take place as soon as the administrative steps incident to arrest
are completed. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Presumably, Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens were unwilling to concur in Justice Scalia's reasoning at least partly because of his
reliance on the common law as a basis for interpreting the right against unreasonable seizures.
See id. at 1672-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, as published, Justice Scalia's opinion
contained an introduction that referred disparagingly to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). See County of Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1671 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Roe Court created rights not in the Constitution). If that reference were contained in
Justice Scalia's opinion when it was circulated to the Court, the other three dissenting justices
undoubtedly would have been unwilling to subscribe to it. It may be, of course, that Justice
Scalia added the reference to Roe only after it became apparent that none of the other dissenting justices would join his opinion.
188. County of Riverside, I11 S. Ct. at 1672 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
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determination of probable cause "as soon as he reasonably can." 18 9 As
Justice Scalia noted, the Court did not even acknowledge, much less attempt to distinguish, decisions holding that delay was impermissible
under the common law if it exceeded the period within which an arrest
warrant could have been obtained. 190 Given the cavalier disregard for
common-law decisions that clearly would have dictated a result contrary
to government interests in County of Riverside, it is hard to imagine that
the Court considered itself compelled in HodariD. to accept commonlaw decisions whose dictates were far from clear.
Second, the Court's rejection of a reasonableness requirement as a
"vague admonition" in County of Riverside warrants skepticism about
whether the result in Jimeno was truly dictated, as claimed, by "the
Fourth Amendment's basic test of objective reasonableness." ' 191 In
County of Riverside the Court understandably framed the question before
it as "what is 'prompt' under Gerstein," '9 2 rather than "what is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment."1 93 It is hard to take issue with the
Court's view in County of Riverside that "reasonableness" would have
provided virtually no guidance on whether probable cause hearings may
be delayed for combination with arraignments.1 94 The concept gives no
greater guidance about the scope of consensual searches, yet it was dispositive in Jimeno.195
Third, the Court's adoption of an absolute forty-eight-hour time
limit in County of Riverside prompts questions about Bostick's rejection
of a per se rule that randomly questioning passengers on a bus constitutes
a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. The Bostick Court took the
view that "seizure" is not susceptible to categorical rules of this nature.
Yet, in County of Riverside, the term "reasonable," a more open-ended
concept, gave rise to a rule that is both categorical and far more arbitrary
than the rule proposed in Bostick. After County of Riverside, if a defendant arrested without a warrant is detained for less than forty-eight hours
(quoting 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 95 n.13 (Philadelphia, Robert H.

Small 1847)).
189. Id at 1669.
190. Id at 1673 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1804 (1991); see supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
192. County of Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1669.
193. Id
194. Id. See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom, The IncredibleShrinking FourthAmendment,
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 271, 309 (1984) (noting that "reasonableness" may be judged by
any of several standards, but the Court has never adopted one, with the result that the term is
"now little more than readily manipulable cant").
195. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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for the purpose of combining a probable cause determination with arraignment, the detention is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment;
however, if the detention exceeds forty-eight hours, it ceases to be "reasonable." The Court adopted this absolute rule "to provide some degree
of certainty so that States and counties may establish procedures with
confidence that they fall within constitutional bounds."' 196 But do police
officers who routinely sweep through buses questioning passengers and
asking permission to search their belongings need less certainty? 197
Just as one might question the rationales underlying the Court's
other Fourth Amendment decisions in light of County of Riverside, one
might similarly question the purported basis of the latter decision. In
County of Riverside, Gerstein purportedly dictated the conclusion that
probable cause hearings properly may be combined with arraignments,
even when some delay ensues.' 98 As Justice Scalia pointed out in his
dissent, however, Gerstein never said that delay may be attributable "to
the administrative convenience of combining the probable-cause determination with other state proceedings."' 9 9 Viewed in context, Gerstein's
reference to "the desirability of flexibility and experimentation," on
which the majority relied, "refers to the nature of the [probable cause]
'2
hearing and not to its timing.'""
At best, the permissibility of the delay
caused by the probable cause/arraignment combination can be gleaned
by "implication [from] the dictum of Gerstein."2 "1 Even that precedent
was questionable, since Gerstein could just as plausibly be read to permit
combining those proceedings only when doing so entails no additional
20 2
delay.
It seems unlikely that the majority felt in any way bound by the
language in the precedent, particularly when the County of Riverside decision is juxtaposed against the decisions in Acevedo and Bostick. In
Acevedo the Court overruled two prior decisions that were squarely on
point to expand the permissible scope of warrantless searches of vehicles.
196. County of Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1670.
197. Likewise, the adoption of the categorical rule in County of Riverside calls into question
the Jimeno Court's rejection of a bright-line rule forbidding officers to search a closed
container when a suspect gave general consent to search the place in which the container was
found. The Jimeno Court found "no basis for adding this sort of superstructure to the Fourth
Amendment's basic test of objective reasonableness." Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1804
(1991); see also supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
198. See County of Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1671 ("Under Gerstein,jurisdictions may choose
to combine probable cause determinations with other pretrial proceedings, so long as they do
so promptly.").
199. Id. at 1674 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In Bostick the Court declined to be bound by the seizure formula used in
several prior decisions. If not bound either by holdings of two prior decisions that it overruled or by a formulation central to holdings it continued to endorse, it is hard to imagine that the Court felt obliged to adhere
to an idea that was, at best, implicit in the dictum of a single prior
opinion.
That the County of Riverside decision was in fact dictated not by
loyalty to precedent but by the personal proclivities of individual Justices
is further indicated by its references to the "balance between competing
interests."20 3 As Justice Scalia noted, any "'balancing' of the competing
demands of the individual and the State" by the majority would have
been "entirely value laden." 2" The weight assigned to these countervailing considerations can only have been determined by the values of the
individual Justices who comprised the majority.
Perhaps the most ominous aspect of the decision in County of Riverside is that the majority's implicit balancing involved a societal interest
far less significant, and an individual interest far more significant, than
typically appears in Fourth Amendment cases. The societal interest in
obtaining evidence of criminal wrongdoing was not at stake here; the relevant societal interest was purely financial. The Court allowed states
forty-eight hours within which to obtain probable cause determinations
to spare them the expense of "hir[ing] additional police officers and magistrates."20 5 At the same time, the individual interest went well beyond
the interest in freedom from brief, unwanted intrusions that was at stake
in the other search-and-seizure cases of the Term; the relevant individual
interest was in freedom from wrongful confinement. If, as the Court apparently concluded, the interest of wrongfully arrested individuals in limiting the period of their confinement is inadequate to outweigh the state
interest in saving a few dollars, then in search-and-seizure cases involving
the discovery of evidence, only the most exceptional interest in privacy
will be sufficiently compelling to outweigh the state interest in promoting
criminal investigations.20 6 Insofar as the current Justices rely on their
203. Id. at 1669, 1670 ("Gerstein clearly contemplated a reasonable accommodation between legitimate competing concerns. We do no more than recognize that such accommodation can take place without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.").
204. Id. at 1674 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
205. Id. at 1669, 1670 (citing the problems of "an overly burdened criminal justice
system").
206. Aside from County of Riverside, the Court's search-and-seizure cases this Term dealt
with the admissibility of evidence against the accused in a criminal prosecution. Conspicuously absent from the majority opinions in three of those four cases-Bostick Acevedo, and
Jimeno-was any expression of concern for the individual interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment. These decisions, giving weight exclusively to the relevant interests of the state,
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own personal preferences, the Fourth Amendment will almost invariably
be interpreted in favor of the State.
IV. CONCLUSION

It would be an understatement to say that the 1990 Term's searchand-seizure decisions fail to reflect a unified jurisprudential approach to
Fourth Amendment interpretation. The Court used and discarded a variety of approaches seemingly at random. In different cases, the Court
purported to be guided in its interpretation of the constitutional provision by the general standard of "reasonableness,""2 7 by the limitations
imposed on the police at common law,20 8 by the need to provide the
police with clear rules,20 9 and by the dictates of precedent.2 10 Yet the

Court denied weight to these same considerations in cases in which they
seemed equally relevant, if not more so.211
The contradictory approaches employed in this small body of decisioris were not simply the product of shifts in the composition of the
majority. At other times, contradictions emerge within a body of related
decisions because different Justices comprise the majority in each case;
this especially tends to be true when related decisions are rendered over a
period of years. In the Fourth Amendment decisions of the Term, however, a core of four Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter-was in the majority in every case.
Justices White, Blackmun, and Scalia joined the majority in most of these
cases. 2 12 Therefore, contradictions cannot be ascribed to efforts to acmirror the Court's recent criminal jurisprudence as a whole. The Court's indifference to individual interests in criminal cases was noted and strongly crtiticized by Justice Blackmun in
another case this Term-Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991)-in which the Court
further limited the availability of the federal habeas corpus relief. At the outset of his dissent,
Justice Blackmun lamented that Justice O'Connor had inventoried the state interests in
"[f]ederalism; comity; state sovereignty; preservation of state resources; [and] certainty," but
that "[o]ne searches the majority's opinion in vain ...for any mention of petitioner Coleman's
right to a criminal proceeding free from constitutional defect or his interest in finding a forum
for his constitutional challenge to his conviction and sentence of death." Id. at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 155, 159-61.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37, 171.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 43 (Jimeno: Court rejected use of categorical
rules); 86-87, 109 (Acevedo: Court rejected precedent); 120-22 (Bostick: Court rejected categorical rules); 148, 151 (HodariD.: Court rejected categorical rules and precedent); 166-70,
187-90 (County of Riverside: Court rejected common law and reasonableness).
212. Justice White dissented in Acevedo; Justice Blackmun joined dissenting opinions in
Bostick and County of Riverside; and Justice Scalia concurred in Acevedo and dissented in
County of Riverside. Given the departure from the majority in one or more Fourth Amend-
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commodate different visions of the Fourth Amendment as the composition of the justices comprising the majority shifted from case to case.
Nor were the contradictions attributable to the desire to achieve
consensus among different justices who reached the same result but for
different reasons. The seven justices who were in the majority in most or
all of this Term's Fourth Amendment cases have not made a practice of
compromising their views to enable the Court to issue a majority opinion. On the contrary, in two criminal cases of the Term, no majority
opinion was produced because the justices who agreed on the outcome of
the case would not agree on a single line of reasoning.2 13
The Court's inconsistency can be understood only by looking at the
outcome of its search-and-seizure decisions: the State won every case.
Interpretative approaches were invariably rejected when they warranted
a result unfavorable to the State. If not dictated by a view about what
considerations deserve weight in interpreting the Fourth Amendment,
the Justices' votes could have been dictated only by their personal preferences, and, particularly, by the strongly held preference apparently
ment decisions this Term, it cannot be said that these justices are invariably result oriented.
On the contrary, two of these justices clearly consider some interpretive principles to be sufficiently important that, if applicable to a given case, they may be adhered to without regard for
the result. For example, Justice White's dissents in Acevedo and in two other cases of the
Term, Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1253 (1991) (White, J., dissenting in part), and
Harmelin v. Michigan, I11 S. Ct. 2680, 2709 (1991) (White J., dissenting), suggest that he is
more likely than other justices to adhere to the principle of stare decisis, even when it goes
against his natural inclinations. But see Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (Justice White joining the majority opinion overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)). Similarly,
Justice Scalia's dissent in County of Riverside demonstrates his adherence to the use of common law as a tool of constitutional interpretation. See also Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491,
2507 (Scalia, J., concurring) (examining historical and common-law practice concerning felony
murder); California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1993 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (using the common law to construe "reasonableness").
Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, appears to approach the Fourth Amendment cases
on an ad hoc basis from a moderate perspective: although generally predisposed to uphold
convictions, there sometimes comes a point that police procedures are sufficiently troubling or
the justifications for them sufficiently attenuated to overcome his usual predisposition. Cf.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927-28 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (concurring in
adoption of good-faith exception to exclusionary rule, but noting that the exception should be
reconsidered if subsequent experience showed "a material change in police compliance with
Fourth Amendment.").
213. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2494; Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2684 (only one part of Justice
Scalia's opinion was joined by four other Justices); Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859,
1863 (1991) (plurality opinion). Moreover, in a number of criminal cases in which there was a
majority opinion, justices wrote or joined separate concurrences to express disagreement with
the majority's reasoning. See, eg., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1897 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring,
joined in part by Blackmun, J.); Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743, 1748 (1991) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
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shared by a majority of the justices for promoting law enforcement at the
expense of personal privacy. It seems fair to infer that the Justices in the
majority approached Fourth Amendment cases with the predetermined
conclusion that the State should prevail, then looked for reasons to explain this result. The Term's decisions thus reflect the Court's readiness
to exercise its power to enact its personal preferences into law whenever
plausible after-the-fact rationalizations can later be advanced as the basis
of its decisions; with so many possible methods of interpretation, reasons
2 14
can seemingly always be found.
One implication of the Justices' indifference to legal reasoning is
that the individual Justice assigned to write for the Court in any given
Fourth Amendment case has virtually free rein to adopt an analysis of
his preference, 2 15 without regard to whether that analysis is the most
persuasive way of reaching the desired result, and without regard to
whether the chosen analysis is one that most other Justices in the majority would have preferred. Thus, in writing for the Court in County of
Riverside, Justice O'Connor emphasized that "proper deference to the
demands of federalism" required construing the arrested defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights narrowly to accommodate the State's interest
in administrative flexibility, thereby sounding a theme-that the principle of federalism calls for narrowly construing criminal defendants' procedural rights-that has recurred throughout her criminal
214. The Court's approach may have implications for legal scholarship. It may well be a
fool's errand for academics to undertake doctrinal analysis in the Fourth Amendment area
with an eye toward rationalizing prior decisions or suggesting the future direction of the law.
215. Undoubtedly, there are limits beyond which the writer may not go. For example, it is
unlikely that Justice Scalia could have commanded a majority for the approach advocated in
his concurring opinion in Acevedo, which would have rejected the "warrant requirement," a
bedrock principle of contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and thereby overruled
a significant number of prior decisions. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992-94 (Scalia, J., concurring).
An example from the 1990 Term where Justice Scalia apparently did go too far after being
assigned to write for the Court in a criminal case is Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. 2680. In Harmelin
the Court considered whether a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole was
"cruel and unusual punishment" when imposed on an individual convicted of possessing cocaine. Id. at 2684. Justice Scalia argued that a sentence of imprisonment should never be
considered "cruel and unusual punishment" and that the Court should therefore overrule Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983), which set aside as disproportionate under the Eighth
Amendment a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole imposed on a recidivist who had committed exclusively nonviolent offenses. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686. Justice
Scalia announced the opinion of the Court, but the bulk of his opinion was joined only by the
Chief Justice, who apparently had assigned Justice Scalia to write an opinion for the Court.
Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, in which
he opined that the Court should adhere to the disproportionality principle applied in Solem
and recognized in other decisions, but that Harmelin's sentence was not unconstitutionally
excessive. Id. at 2705, 2708 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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jurisprudence.2 16 Likewise, in his opinion for the Court in Hodari D.,
Justice Scalia relied principally on the common law to define "seizure"
under the Fourth Amendment2 1 7 in a mode of analysis he has promoted

in other criminal cases.218
If the Court's approach continues to be marked by "power, not reason," one can expect it to do more in the coming years than simply fill in
the interstices in the current law of criminal procedure with rulings
favorable to the State. As Justice Marshall warned, the Court's approach
to deciding cases opens the way to "a far-reaching assault" on existing
precedents that interpret the Constitution to protect individual privacy
and autonomy at the expense of majoritarian interests.2 19 His last dissent
216. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1668 (1991). For other examples
of Justice O'Connor's approach to procedural rights of the criminally accused, see Heath v.
Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985) (noting that doctrine that the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not bar successive prosecutions for the same offense brought by different sovereigns "finds
weighty support in the historical understanding and political realities of the States' role in the
federal system"); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (availability of federal writ of habeas
corpus "frustrate[s] . . .the States' sovereign power"). The apotheosis of this theme was
reached during the 1990 Term in Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Coleman v.
Thompson, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991), which began: "This is a case about federalism." Id. at
2552. The decision further narrowed the availability of federal habeas relief for defendants
convicted in state court. Id at 2559, 2565.
217. California v. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1550 n.2 (1991).
218. See, eg., Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686-91; Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. at 1993 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 1018 n.2 (1988) (evaluating the use of
close circuit television or screens for child witnesses in sexual assault trials under the Sixth
Amendment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 864, 872 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(evaluating historical practice in considering whether the death penalty for defendants who
committed crimes while under the age of 16 violates cruel and unusual punishment
prohibition).
219. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2625 (1991) (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Justice
Marshall opined that scores of opinions upholding the constitutional rights of individuals were
in jeopardy and identified 10 recent constitutional decisions that he believed to be particularly
endangered. Id. at 2623 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 2729 (1990) ("First Amendment right not to be denied public employment
on the basis of party affiliation"); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S.
Ct. 2281 (1990) ("First Amendment right to advertise legal specialization"); Zinerman v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) ("due process right to procedural safeguards aimed at assuring
voluntariness of decision to commit oneself to mental hospital"); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
307 (1990) ("Fourth Amendment right to exclusion of illegally obtained evidence introduced
for impeachment of defense witnesses"); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) ("First
Amendment right of public employee to express views on matter of public importance"); Rock
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) ("Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment right of criminal
defendant to provide hypnotically refreshed testimony on his own behalf"); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) ("rejecting applicability of harmless error analysis to Eighth
Amendment right not to be sentenced to death by 'death-qualified' jury"); Maine v. Moulton,
474 U.S. 159 (1985) ("Sixth Amendment right to counsel violated by introduction of statements made to government informant-codefendant in course of preparing defense strategy");
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) ("rejecting theory that
Tenth Amendment provides immunity to states from federal regulation"); Pulliam v. Allen,
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was, thus, a valedictory not only to a transformed Court but also, it may
turn out, to many of the constitutional precedents that he had joined in
setting over the preceding quarter century. And few precedents are at
greater risk than those upholding the Fourth Amendment rights of criminal defendants.

466 U.S. 522 (1984) ('right to obtain injunctive relief from constitutional violations committed
by judicial officials")).

